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temporarily stayed. The net effect of such a legislative provision would
be that, in most instances the individuals who had received fair treatment at the administrative level would not appeal, and those drivers
with a special hardship or with an improper suspension could, with a
small amount of danger to the public, continue to drive until they had
had an opportunity to be heard. Texas has adopted this approach in
the licensing area."
In Gnecchi the Washington court has continued to follow the privilege doctrine in the licensing area. It is suggested that the privilege
doctrine should have been rejected and at the same time the Director's
action could have been sustained. The court should have adopted the
position that once the state has issued the license a valuable interest
attaches and that the license holder cannot be deprived of his interest
without receiving fair treatment. Immediate suspension of a driver's
license, subject to speedy and complete judicial review such as is provided in Washington, affords fair treatment when viewed in terms of
the pressing public necessity which is involved. This, rather than the
conclusion that a driver's license is a privilege for which any procedure
will satisfy due process, should be the basis for upholding the immediate
suspension of a driver's license without a prior hearing.
FRED D. SMITH

Standing to Challenge Constitationality of Loyalty Oath. In
Nostrand v. Little,' the Washington State Supreme Court had an opportunity to pass on the much publicized loyalty oath required of
certain state employees. Against a charge that procedural due process
was violated because the statute calls for immediate dismissal upon
non-compliance, the court found that the oath abridged no constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, two University of Washington professors.
The background of the case is both interesting and complex. In
1959, the professors asked for a declaratory judgment 2 to determine the
constitutionality of the statute requiring them to take an oath and
sign an affidavit in which they disclaimed any present association with
the Communist Party or any other subversive organizations. They
27 Dep't of Public Safety v. Gillaspie, 254 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) aff'd
on rehearing,259 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Sup. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 933 (1954).

158 Wn.2d 111,361 P.2d 551 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 436 (1962).
2 Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wrn.2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959),
remanded, 362 U.S. 474

(1960).
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challenged the statute3 on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder, 4
that it abridged freedom of speech and association,5 that only the
federal government had the power to enact subversive activities statutes,' and that the oath forced one to be a witness against himself.'
The professors were required to swear,
That I am not a subversive person or a member of the Communist Party
or any subversive organization, foreign, or otherwise, which engages in
or advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the overthrow, destruction, or
alteration of the constitutional form of government of the United States,
or of the State of Washington, or of any political subdivision of either
of them, by revolution, force or violence; ....
8
Failure to take the oath was made "cause for immediate termination
of such employee's employment." 9 There was no finding at the trial
court level that the professors ever refused or intended to refuse to
sign the affidavit or take the oath. The Washington Supreme Court
upheld the oath and construed it only as imposing a qualification for
employment on the state's employees. The professors then applied
for a rehearing, raising the issue of lack of procedural due process,
because the statute required immediate dismissal with no opportunity
for a hearing in which they could defend their positions. This issue
had not been presented to the court at the first argument, so a rehearing
was denied.' The professors then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court," which remanded the case, ordering the Washington
court to answer the charge that there was no hearing. On remand,
the court found that, although the statute provided no hearing for the
professors, they had tenure rights under the University of Washington
Regulations, 2 including the right to hearing before the University's
3 RCW 9.81.070.
4 U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 9, "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."
vASH. CONST. art. I, § 23, "No bill of attainder... shall ever be passed."
5 U.S. CowsT. amend. I, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech... or the right of the people to peaceably assemble."
' Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
The Court held that the Smith Act
superceded the Pennsylvania sedition act and the federal government had pre-empted
the field of sedition. The Washington court distinguished this case on the grounds (1)
it did not prevent states from passing laws designed to suppress sedition against the
state, and (2) it did not affect a state's right to prescribe qualifications for its employees.
7U.S.
CON ST. amend. V, "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." WASM. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, "No person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to give evidence against himself....!
Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wn.2d 460, 464, 335 P.2d 10, 12 (1959).
oRCW 9.81.070.
"I State ex rel. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. v. Superior Court, 54 Wash. 365, 377, 104
Pac. 175 (1909). "We cannot sanction the practice of permitting new questions to be
raised in petition for rehearing."
"1Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960).
12 FACULTY HANDBOOK, UNivERsrTY OF WASHINGTON § 2552 (1956).
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Tenure Committee prior to dismissal; thus the professors were not
denied due process.
Keeping in mind that these professors were not applying for teaching positions, but had tenure rights under their employment contracts,
the case raises a number of interesting problems. The first pertains
to the standing requirements for one who wishes to challenge state
legislation under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. "3 To obtain
a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff must meet several conditions. Most
important, a case or controversy within the meaning of article III of
the federal constitution or article IV, section 1 of the state constitution
must exist. In addition, the court in Acme Finance Co. v. Huse"
developed other prerequisites to use of the declaratory judgment:
[A] proper case for such relief is presented when a plaintiff alleges
(1) that he will be directly damaged in person or in property by enforcement of a statute; (2) that the defendant is charged with the duty
of enforcing the statute; and (3) is enforcing it or is about to do so;
and claims, upon these allegations, that such enforcement will result in
the infringement of his (the plaintiff's) constitutional rights.15
In the Nostrand case, the court indicated that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because they had not refused or shown any intent to refuse
to sign the loyalty oath and thus had suffered no injury." The court
said, "In the absence of such a showing it would seem premature,
even in a declaratory judgment action, for a court to rule on a hypothetical situation."'" In a subsequent part of the opinion, the court
specifically denied standing to the professors,
Were it not for the fact that this case has been remanded to this court
by the Supreme Court with the request that we interpret the act with
respect to the hearing issue, we would dismiss the professors' case as not
being timely raised.1 8
The finding that the professors lacked standing is particularly odd in
view of Huntamer v. Coe." A statute required that prospective candi13 RCW 7.24.010-.180.
14 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341 (1937).
15 Id. at 107, 73 P.2d at 345.
106Immediately after the suit was commenced, the professors were quoted in the
Seattle Post Intelligencer, Aug. 30, 1955, p. 4, col. 3, as saying this is "a friendly suit
and not a protest against the University of Washington." Professor Nostrand said,
"This has nothing to do with my personal past. I have not been a member of the 261
organizations named by the Attorney General." These statements were not brought out
at the trial or appellate court level.
.7Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wn.2d 111, 119, 361 P.2d 551, 556 (1961), cert. denlied, 368
U.S.8 436 (1962).
1 Id.at 120, 361 P.2d at 557.
19 40 Wn2d 767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952).
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dates for the offices of governor, congressman, and state representative
execute affidavits in which they declared that they were not subversive
persons as defined by the act."0 The plaintiffs refused to sign, and the
court allowed them to challenge the statute, saying,
Because of the particular circumstances of this case, involving, as they
do, some questions of considerable public interest and importance, we
think the trial court acted properly in assuming jurisdiction to adjudicate certain
questions in the case under our declaratory judgment
21
statute.

The court took the position in Huntamer that when the public need is
great enough, state legislation may be challenged even though no injury
has been sustained. The court was fully aware of its action, since it
cited numerous cases in which a declaratory judgment had been denied,
but simply stated that it declined to follow those cases.
Because of Nostrand and Huntamer, confusion now exists about the
extent of harm a plaintiff must suffer before he has standing to challenge
state legislation dealing with civil liberties. In both cases the question
of "loyalty oaths" was presented, and it seems that the court in
Nostrand should be more willing to protect one whose job may be in
jeopardy than one who merely aspires to a political office."
20 RCW 9.81.100.

"I Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wn.2d 767, 770, 246 P2d 489, 491 (1952).
22 In two excellent articles by Professor Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Public Actions, 74 HAgv. L. Rxv. 1265 (1961), and Standing to Secure JudicialReview:
PrivateActions, 75 HAzv. L. REv. 255 (1961), a possible basis is suggested for granting
standing to those in a position similar to the plaintiffs' in Nostrand. Legal action
initiated by citizens, who do not themselves suffer legal harm, is justified on the theory
of self-government; i.e. a control of growing officialdom. Id. at 1282-1307. Such suits
are viewed as providing protection for "special interest groups" as well as the general
public. Professor Jaffee concludes that public action does have a place in our judicial
system where other processes of government provide no adequate remedy.
Query whether standing should be granted on grounds less tangible than loss of income. If civil liberties are directed toward protecting and preserving the dignity of man,
then degradation of dignity will provide a basis for standing. Perhaps interference with
academic freedom, an activity basic to the democratic process, may be a violation of an
intangible which would permit a plaintiff standing before the Washington court.
Subsequent to Nostrand, the United States Supreme Court in Cramp v. Board of
Public Instruction, 82 Sup. Ct. 275 (1961), granted standing to a Florida school teacher
to challenge a statute requiring state employees to execute a loyalty oath. Failure to
subscribe to the oath resulted in immediate dismissal. The teacher stated in his complaint that he was not a member of the Communist Party and did not believe in the
violent overthrow of the Government of the United States. Against the argument that
these allegations were admissions of lack of injury, the Court felt that the oath was so
vague that others, including the local prosecuting attorney, could misconstrue it, and the
teacher might be subjected to criminal prosecution for perjury. The Court said at 279,
'"Wecannot say that appellant lacks standing to attack this statutory oath as unconstitutionally vague simply because he now personally believes he could prevail in the
event he were prosecuted for perjury." The Cramp decision makes the Nostrand case
of questionable authority for denial of standing because the prospective oath challenger
has showed no intention of refusing to subscribe to the oath.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37

A second problem raised by the Nostrand case concerns the conditions necessary to establish the right to a hearing. The underlying
reason for a hearing is stated succinctly by Professor Davis:
The true principle is that a party who has a sufficient interest or right
at stake in a determination of government action should be entitled to
an opportunity to know and to meet... unfavorable evidence... except

in the rare circumstance where some other interest, such as national
security, justifies the overriding of a fair hearing2 3
The court never passed on whether the statute violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment; instead it took refuge in finding
that the professors were adequately protected because University Regulations24 allowed them a hearing before dismissal. In rendering this
decision, the court continued its practice of avoiding constitutional
questions whenever possible 5 Numerous cases in the United States
Supreme Court could have provided the foundation for an opinion
dealing with the professors' right to a hearing prior to dismissal.
In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, " the Court
allowed three organizations to obtain review of the Attorney General's
action in placing them on a subversive list. Mr. Justice Jackson in
his concurring opinion stated,
Unless a hearing is provided in which the organization presents evidence as to its character, a presumption of disloyalty is entered against
its every member-employee, and because of it, he may be branded disloyal, discharged, and rendered ineligible for government service. I
would reverse
the decision for lack of due process in denying a hearing
27
at any stage.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand why such reasoning
should not apply with even more force to one who is about to lose his
job for not swearing an oath, where no hearing at which he can explain
his refusal is provided. In this circumstance silence will be interpreted
by many in the community as evidence of association with a subversive
organization and will attach a stigma of guilt to the one who refuses
to take the oath.
23 1 DAVIS, ADWINISTRATIVE LAW 412 (1958).
24 FACULTY HANDBOOK, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

§ 2552 (1956). The court's
refuge in the University Regulations is interesting as they were neither included in the
parties'
briefs nor introduced at the trial.
25
Townsend G. & E. Light Co. v. Hill, 24 Wash. 469, 64 Pac. 778 (1901) ; State
ex rel. Campbell v. Case, 182 Wash. 334, 47 P.2d 24 (1935). Cf. State ex rel. Holcomb
v. Armstrong, 39 Wn.2d 860, 863, 239 P2d 545, 548 (1952) : "There is no presumption
in favor of the constitutionality of any regulation involving civil rights."
26341 U.S. 123 (1951).
27 Id. at 187.

1962]

WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961

In Garner v. Board of Public Works,2" it was decided that a state
could inquire into matters which related to the competency of its
employees, including past and present affiliation with the Communist
Party. If the employees failed to give the pertinent information, they
could be dismissed. In Wieman v. Updegraff,2 9 the Court held that an
employee of the state (a university professor) could not be dismissed
pursuant to a statute which classified membership in subversive organizations without regard to knowledge of the unlawful character of the
organization.
[T] he fact of association alone determines disloyalty and disqualification; it matters not whether association existed innocently or knowingly.
... Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must
fall as an assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends due process. 30
In Slockower v. Board of Higher Education,"-which held that discharge of a teacher for exercising his constitutional privilege under
the fifth amendment created an unreasonable inference of guilt and
thus violated due process, the Court said,
The State has broad powers in the selection and discharge of its employees, and it may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's
continued employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the
State. But there has been no such inquiry here. We hold
that the
32
summary dismissal of appellant violates due process of law.
In both Slochower and Wieman, the Court recognized the principle
that the individual must be protected by an opportunity to defend
his position and that due process is violated if he is not. In Wieman,
it objected to dismissal of those employees who had innocently joined
"subversive organizations." In Nostrand, the Washington court was
careful to point out that innocent membership would not be punished.
The court, however, left open the problem that without even an
informal hearing there is no way to determine whether membership
is innocent. The result is that since silence may be construed by the
community as guilt, the individual is a marked man although he has
not had his "day in court." In short, by avoiding the constitutional
issue, the Washington court in Nostrand apparently, tacitly implies
that a statute which allows a man with vested tenure rights to be dis341 U.S. 716 (1951).
29 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
30 Id. at 191.
31350 U.S. 551 (1956).
32 Id. at 559.
28
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charged without a hearing is in harmony with the spirit of the United
States Constitution and, in particular, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has indicated on several occasions that the state's interest does allow a certain
degree of inquiry into the associations of its employees. In Nelson v.
County of Los Angeles,3 one Globe, a temporary county employee,
was discharged for insubordination when he refused to answer an
inquiry about his affiliations with the Communist Party. The Court
carefully pointed out the the employee's dismissal, without a hearing,
was not based on the claim of privilege of the first and fifth amendments, but rather upon his insubordination. Another example is Beilan
v. Board of Public Education,3 4 in which a school teacher declined to
answer questions relating to his connection with the Communist Party.
The court stated that although a teacher is not required to give up his
right to free thought, speech, and association, he is required to cooperate
with his superiors. Failure to reply to questions warrants dismissal on
the basis of incompetency.3 5 University of Washington Regulations'
provide that faculty members with tenure rights may be removed for
incompetency; thus by analogy to Beilan, it may be possible to justify
the discharge of the professors for failure to subscribe to the oath on
the basis of incompetency."
From these cases it follows that the states have the power, within
limits, to create qualifications and to make inquiry of their employees.
One of these qualifications may be the swearing of a loyalty oath.
Such oaths do not offend due process so long as they inquire into
knowing membership in subversive organizations.
An interesting and related problem is posed by the Washington
court's determination that the professors are entitled to a hearing before
the University's Tenure Committee." Under the Regulations," the
dean of the college or school in which the faculty member in question
is employed is charged with the duty of issuing a petition against him.
33 362 U.S. 1 (1960).

-4 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
5 Id. at 408. The Court

defines incompetency as failure to answer questions of an
administrative superior which relate to fitness.
36 FACULTY HAINooK, UNERSITY OF WASHINGTON § 2551 A 1 (1956).

37 See Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) in which failure to testify about communist activities resulted in discharge because of plaintiff's doubtful trust and reliability.
Query whether such reasoning could not also be a legal justification for discharge of the
professors in Nostrand.
88 Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wn.2d 111, 132, 361 P.2d 551, 563 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 436 (1962).
39 See FACULTY HANDBOK, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON § 2562 (1956).
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The Regulations are silent on the type of hearing to be conducted;
i.e. whether or not the reasons for refusal may be proved. If the Tenure
Committee were only to determine that the oath had not been taken
and then discharged the professors, such a futile hearing would surely
not satisfy due process. On the other hand, if the Committee were
to allow the professors to justify their position and excuse them from
swearing the oath, then an administrative agency (Tenure Committee)
would be modifying the "loyalty oath" statute. The court's finding that
the professors are entitled to hearing before the Tenure Committee
does not solve the problem for other state employees who work for
agencies which have no machinery for a hearing. The court's treatment
of the hearing issue has not foreclosed future litigation on the point. 0
A third problem posed in Nostrand v. Little concerns the state Administrative Procedure Act., In refusing to apply the act, the court
stated,
There is nothing in the administrative code which indicates to us a
legislative intent to amend or repeal the statutes relating to the operation of the University of Washington which have been in effect for
fifty years.

42

It is unfortunate that such a remark should have been made, as it takes
much vitality from the pertinent sections 3 of the APA.
Since Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath," the first case in which the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to determine the scope of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, the Court has been liberal in its construction of the act. Statements such as, "Where the remedy of an
evil is clear, the remedial provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act should be given full effect," 5 are not uncommon. In future cases
dealing with the scope of the state APA, it should be argued that the
APA will not be used to interfere with the internal operation of the
40 The 1961 Civil Service Law, RCW 41.06, may provide the necessary machinery
for administrative hearings of the "loyalty oath" cases; however, the statute, RCW
41.06.070 (3), exempts academic personnel at the University of NVashington from its
coverage.

4'RCW 34.04.010-.930.
4258 Wn.2d 111, 132, 361

P.2d 551, 564 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 426 (1962).

43 RCW 34.04.090 (1), "In any contested case all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice." RCW 34.04.010 (3) defines a contested
case as "a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an
agency hearing."
44339 U.S. 33 (1950).
4r Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 353 U.S. 436, 440

(1957).
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University of Washington, but that the University itself is not exempt
from the APA 6
In summary, the Nostrand case (1) creates confusion on the injury
a plaintiff must suffer before having standing to challenge a state statute, (2) sanctions the discharge of state employees for refusal to swear
a loyalty oath without an opportunity for a statutory hearing to explain
the refusal, and (3) seems to exempt the University of Washington
from the state Administrative Procedure Act. Nostrand,however, does
put Washington in accord with a majority of states which allow
creation of employment qualifications in the form of loyalty oaths."
DAVID C. LYCETTE

ATTORNEY-CLIENT
Disciplinary Proceedings-Mental Competency. May mental irresponsibility be an effective defense in disciplinary proceedings brought
against an attorney? The Washington court answered in the affirmative
in the recent case of In re Sherman,' setting forth the requirements for
such a defense.
In 1960 the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Association recommended "the disbarment of Arthur Eber Sherman, Jr.,
for making false answers in his application for admission [by examination] to practice law in the state of Washington."' The board also recommended a reprimand for insulting and contemptuous petitions for
46 Subsequent to Nostrand, the Washington Supreme Court determined that the state
APA repealed, by implication, a long standing statute which required appeals involving
the Public Service Commission to be filed within twenty days of judgment rather than
thirty. See Herrett Trucking Co. v. Washington Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 58 Wn.2d 542, 364
P.2d 505 (1961). Query, if the court could find legislative intent to repeal such a long
standing statute, why could it not find a similar intent to repeal statutes relating to the
operation of the University of Washington?
47 After this note was written, the plaintiffs' appeal to the Supreme Court was denied
in a per curiam decision on the ground that there was no substantial federal question.
368 U.S. 436 (1962).
1158 Wash. Dec. 399, 363 P.2d 390 (1961) (on rehearing). The first decision is
reported in 156 Wash. Dec. 531, 354 P.2d 888 (1960).
2RCW 2.48.060. "Admission and disbarment. The said board of governors shall
likewise have power... to investigate, prosecute and hear all causes involving discipline,
disbarment, suspension or reinstatement, and make recommendations thereon to the
supreme court...."
3 It re Sherman, 156 Wash. Dec. 531, 354 P.2d 888 (1960). In December, 1956,
Sherman applied for permission to take the Washington bar examination. After falsely
stating that he had never before taken another bar examination, he ignored the question, "If so, were you successful?" In fact, Sherman had twice taken, and failed, the
California bar examination. He had twice taken, and failed once, the Oregon bar
examination.

